Electronic voting in Belgium

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Electronic voting in Belgium began in 1991 with two pilot sites to test different electronic systems during the general election on 24 November 1991. A law passed on 16 July 1991 allowed the experiment. The two systems tested were a touch-panel system similar to one used in the Netherlands and a magnetic-card system with an electronic ballot marking device and a light pen.

In the 1994 European and local elections, the experiment was extended to about 22% of the population, covering big cities, small villages, and areas with Dutch, French, or both languages. By 1999 the program reached about 44% of voters. However, concerns from groups like Pour Eva and growing doubts led to new tests and more controls. One major change was the introduction of optical reading of paper ballots in two areas, creating a Voter Verified Paper Audit Trail to allow a human recount. An expert committee found the process relied heavily on the system’s vendor.

In 2000, the Auderghem local elections sparked legal challenges about the legality of e-voting, reaching the European Court of Human Rights, which dismissed the case without examining its content.

In 2003 a new “Ticketing” system was tried in the original e-voting locations. A printer next to the machine produced a paper copy of each vote, which voters approved. After polling, both paper votes and electronic results were counted. When discrepancies arose, the law stated that the paper tally should prevail, but the authorities eventually favored the electronic result, contrary to the law. That test was planned for one election only.

By 2004, all tests were ended and the 44% of voters already using e-voting continued with the magnetic-card system. The earlier optical-reading and ticketing approaches were dropped, and the equipment from 1994 was used for one more year even though it was not intended for long-term use.

From 1999 onward there were notable problems. In the 18 May 2003 elections in Schaerbeek, a party (MARIA) appeared to receive 4096 extra votes due to a software issue, which was explained as a spurious memory bit error. Some suggested cosmic rays could cause such an error, though that was not confirmed. A 2004 analysis of the Digivote system found several security issues, including weak encryption keys, leakage of sensitive information, and insecure coding practices, plus a vulnerability to a limited replay attack. Digivote is a trade name used by a German company and should not be confused with the Belgian Digivote ballot system.

Overall, the Belgian experience showed persistent concerns about reliability, security, and dependence on vendors, and the program did not continue to expand after 2004.